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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UNITED AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL
BANK, a national
association,
Defendant & Third-Party
Respondent,
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON and
KATHLEEN JOHNSON, his
wife; GLENDON E. JOHNSON
and BOBETTE JOHNSON, his
wife; CLIFTON I. JOHNSON;
JOHNSON LAND COMPANY, a
partnership; and BAR 70
RANCHES, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

No. 17187

Third-Party &
Additional Party
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF

FILED
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Seventh District Court of Grand County

JUN - 8 1981

Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge

Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant:

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondent:

EDWARD M. GARRETT
GARRETT AND STURDY
311 South State Street
Suite 320
Slat Lake City, Utah 84111

RICHARD H. NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON

I

79 South State # 7 0 0 , ,·.. ~.·.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

llllllll

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UNITED AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL
BANK, a national
association,
Defendant & Third-Party
Respondent,
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON and
KATHLEEN JOHNSON, his
wife; GLENDON E. JOHNSON
and BOBETTE JOHNSON, his
wife; CLIFTON I. JOHNSON;
JOHNSON LAND COMPANY, a
partnership; and BAR 70
RANCHES, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

No. 17187

Third-Party &
Additional Party
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF

Respondent'a Brief raises two points of argument that were
not discussed in Appellant's initial brief.

These two points

are material to the decision of this case but not dispositive.
The argument set forth by the bank is not meritorious but does
create an erroneous impression and may cause confusion if not
adequately dealt with at this time.
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POINT I
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF) WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PLEAD THE WORD
"ESTOPPEL" IN ITS COMPLAINT.
The position taken by Respondent bank at the time the case
was argued at the conclusion of the evidence and alluded to by
the lower Court in its corrunents after the case was argued was
that Plaintiff was precluded from raising the doctrine of
estoppel because it was not pled.

The bank announced this de-

fense only after all of the evidence was in and both sides had
rested.
Plaintiff asserted in the lower Court, as on appeal, that
the bank accepted the conditional check, cashed the same, and
retained the proceeds and could not thereafter deny its duty
to release the Trust Deed.
An elementary question of pleading is raised by the argu-

ment of the bank.

That question is whether a Plaintiff must,

in so many words, raise the doctrine of estoppel in the Complaint and even further, must a Plaintiff use the word "estoppel"
in a Complaint or be precluded from asserting that doctrine
at the time of trial?

The argument of the bank seems to

assume that when a Plaintiff sets forth grounds for relief in
a Complaint that he must also anticipate denials by a Defendant
and set forth affirmative defenses to those denials in the
Complaint.

This is the concept contended for by the bank and

is fallacious and not in accord with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rule S(a) provides:
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"Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or
several different types may be demanded."
This rule does not require that a pleader anticipate a defense
or denial and assert in the Complaint an affirmative defense
to the unstated denial.
It is well that the Court have before it the claim stated
by Plaintiff in its Complaint and Amended Complaint.
80-81) (Record 2)

(Record

The paragraphs are identical in both the

Complaint and Amended Complaint.

"7. On and before January 2, 1974, defendant agreed with
plaintiff's predecessors to release or reconvey its trust
deed on the lands described above conditioned on the payment to it of the sum of $50,000 in partial payment of
said trust deed note.
8. On January 2, 1974, plaintiff deposited with Title
Insurance Agency of Utah the sum of $152,816.98 with
written instructions concerning the disbursement of said
sum.
One term of the instruction provided that Title
Insurance Agency of Utah should pay to the defendant the
sum of $50,000 and to obtain therefore a reconveyance of
the property described herein and in said trust deed.
9.
In accordance with the instructions given by plaintiff,
Title Insurance Agency of Utah prepared and delivered to
defendant its certain check with voucher attached in the
amount of $50,000. A copy of said check and voucher is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and made a part hereof as
though fully set forth.
10.
Defendant received and negotiated the $50,000 check
accepted the funds represented thereby; and still has in
its possession the voucher portion of the check.
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11. Although demand has been made, defendant refused and
continues to refuse to execute and deliver its instrument
of reconveyance or other release of the aforesaid trust
deed in accordance with its agreement.
12. To assert its lien, although unlawful and contrary
to its agreement with plaintiff's predecessors, defendant executed a document entitled "Notice of Default" dated
March 20, 1978. A copy of said Notice of Default is
attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and made a part hereof
as though fully set forth.
Said Notice of Default was
recorded in the office of the Grand County Recorder,
March 31, 1978, in Book 277, Page 435.
13. Although contrary to its agreement with Plaintiff's
predecessors, Defendant has threatened to and will, unless
enjoined and restrained, exervise the power of sale in
said Trust Deed and after notice for publication offer
the real property described herein for public sale to the
highest bidder, all to the damage and detriment of plaintiff.
The foregoing paragraphs adequately and completely state a claim.
Further, those paragraphs clearly give rise to estoppel.

In

~~

stance, it is said that the bank made an agreement; accepted and
retained the consideration therefore; has reneged on that agreement to the detriment of Plaintiff who changed its position in
reliance thereon.
It is without diepute that all of the evidence introduced
by the Plaintiff in this action materially related to the
issues raised by the allegations of the Complaint and the legal
theories associated therewith including estoppel.

At trial, no

objection was made by Respondent that the evidence went to a
legal theory not pleaded.
In an analogous situation, our Court has dealt with affirmative defenses raised at trial but not pled by Defendnat.
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In the

case of Cheney v. Rucker,

381 P.2d 86

(Utah) the Court stated:

"[12-15] Plaintiff also raises the procedural point that
since defendants did not plead the subsequent agreement
as an affirmative defense, they should not have been
permitted to rely thereon.
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative
defenses be pleaded.
It is a good rule whose purpose is
to have the issues to be tried clearly framed.
But it
is not the only rule in the book of Rules of Civil Procedure.
They must all be look to in the light of their
even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both
pleading ad procedure to the end that the parties are
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
What
they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and
an opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished,
that is all that is required. 1 2 Our rules provide for
liberality to allow examination into and settlement of
all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard
the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time
meet a new issue if he so requests.
Rule 15(b) U.R.C.P.,
so states.
It further allows for an amendment to conform
to the proof after trial or even after judgment, and
indicates that if the ends of justice so require:
"Failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of these issues." This idea is conformed by Rule 54 (c) (1),
U.R.C.P.:
"[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings."
Although the plaintiff did object to evidence on the
issue of subsequent agreement, when it was overruled,
he made no request for a continuance nor did he make
any representation to the court that he was taken by
surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage in meeting
that issue. The trial court not only did not abuse
his discretion in allowing the issue to be raised and
receiving the contract in evidence, but he would have
failed the plain mandate of justice had he refused to
do so.
12.

See Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corporation, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264
P.2d 279.
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See also the following cases:
Cellucci v. Sunn Oil Company, 320 NE2d 919
Greer v. Chelewski, 76 NW 2nd 438
Lumber, 519 P2d 269,

(Mass.) and

(Neb.), Palmer v. Crews

(Okla.), Farley v. United Pacific Insurance

Company, 525 P2d. 1003

(Ore.. )
POINT II

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE.
Respondent argues in its brief that the action of Plaintiff
is barred by the statute of frauds

(25-5-1 U.C.A. 1953).

Impli~

in that argument is the concept that a lien against real property
can only be released by an instrument in writing because a
mortgage or trust deed is a conveyance".
That is not the law in Utah.

A mortgage or trust deed on

real property can be released by parol agreement.
In the case of Bybee, et al. v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189
P2d. 118, the Court stated:
"Utah, along with most of the other western states, has long
been recognized as a 'lien theory' state.
Section 60,67,78.
This court has repeatedly said that a mortgage in this state
does not vest title in the mortgagee but merely created a
lien in his favor.
Thompson v. Cheeseman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P.
477; Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49P. 779; Azzalia v.
St. Claire, 23 Utah 401, 64 P. 1106; Carlquist v. Coltharp,
67 Utah 514, 248 P. 481 47 A.L.R. 765; In re Reynolds'
Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270.
These cases are largely
based on a statutory provision which appears in our 1943
Code at Sec. 104-57-7 and is as follows:
A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance,
whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the
mortgage to recover possession of the real property without
a foreclosure and sale."
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Utah has not passed directly on the issue of whether a release of
a mortgage comes under the statute of fraud, but given the fact
that Utah is a lien theory state, then the text and cases overwelmingly support the view that such lien can be released by
parol.
"A difference of opinion, based largely upon the theory of
the nature of a mortgage, exists as to the application of
the statute of frauds to an oral agreement to release or
discharge a mortgage.
In those jurisdictions where a
mortgage is considered as amounting to a lien or security
merely, it is generally held that a parol release or discharge of, or an agreement to release or discharge a mortgage
and the discharge of the mortgagor from personal liability
are not within the statute of frauds . .
72 A. Jur. 2nd, Statute of Frauds, Section 91.
See also:
32 ALR 874, Nye v. University Development Company, 179
SE2nd, 795 (N.C.); Rebold Lumber Company v. Scripture Company,
279 SW, 586 (Tex.) Kistler v. Latham, 244 SW, 985 (TEX.)

Additionally, there is ample support for the proposition
that the check and voucher thereon represented a sufficient writing
to satisfy the statute of frauds.
in a case such as this.

Formality is not the standard

It is sufficient that the check identify

the transaction, the parties, and the property.
v. Moran, Mass., 268 N.W. 2d 844

(1971).

ABC Auto Parts

The requirement of a

signature is fulfilled by the endorsement of the check by the
party to be charged.
370

(1974).

Favor v. Joseph, 16 Ariz. App. 420, 494 P.2d

A description is adequate "if it identifies the

property with such particularity that it cannot be confused with
or claims to apply to any other property" and is no objection that
it appears on another document, because a deficiency in one may
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be cured by reference to the other.

Thompson v. Giddings,

276 P.2d 299 at 233 (Okla., 1954).
The bank contends that it should not be bound by a machine
stamped endorsement.

Suffice it to say that in this day and age

that is the way banks communicate, i.e., by machine.
CONCLUSION
The contention of the bank that "estoppel" must be stated
in a pleading before it can be raised as an issue is not the
law.

The Complaint adequately informed the Defendant of the

nature of the claim and the legal issues arising therefrom.
Further, the bank raised no objection to any of the evidence
going to the issue of estoppel.
was confused on this subject.

Quite clearly, the lower court
It is obvious from his announced

decision that confusion on that point as well as others pervaded
his entire decision as announced from the bench.
The statute of frauds has no application to this case becaus;
a mortgage or trust deed in this state can be released, or an
agreement to release, may be entered into by parol.

Additional~.

the bank accepted the check and voucher which identified the trans·
action and this writing is sufficient to satisfv the statute.
One significant point in this case, entirely overlooked
by Respondent, is the fact that Mr. Hintze admitted that he made
a mistake by accepting the check.

The lower court excused his

conduct and, in effect, held that the bank was not bound by the
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action of it's Senior Vice President.

When ordinary people make

a mistake, no such judicial beneficence is forthcoming.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of this lower
court be reversed with direction to the lower court to decree the
release of the Trust Deed.

GARR~TT 'AND STURDY

By

!i:LJ,

Edward M. Garrett

//'.
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